- 'We’re going to face a deterrence-based security future where Europeans will need to constantly play or strike the right balance between deterrence … and diplomacy,' says International Crisis Group's Marta Muchnick
- Deepening cooperation with Türkiye is 'a no-brainer,' Ulgen tells Anadolu, as Europe turns its attention to security partnerships with non-EU NATO allies
ISTANBUL
As the Trump administration weighs shrinking the US military’s cross-Atlantic footprint, European capitals are once again faced with the pivotal question: Can they defend the continent without American support?
Recent reports suggest that the Pentagon is considering a proposal to withdraw about 10,000 US troops stationed in Poland, Germany, and the Baltic states.
While Europe’s corridors of power have long faced the prospect of US military drawdown, President Donald Trump’s push to end the war in Ukraine and improve ties with Russia has brought the focus back to long-avoided questions of continental defense and strategic autonomy.
European leaders have increasingly been vocalizing their commitment to self-reliance, but experts warn that the path ahead bristles with challenges.
According to Sinan Ulgen, a former Turkish diplomat and director of Istanbul-based think tank EDAM, Europe must overcome three fundamental obstacles to achieving meaningful defense independence.
“The fiscal dimension is key,” says Ulgen. “How far are member states really willing to go?”
Defense spending has jumped in Europe in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war, with over 20 NATO countries now meeting the alliance’s target — 2% of gross domestic product. That is up from only six in 2021.
But even if adequate funding materializes, Europe faces a second critical challenge: industrial reorganization.
“Number two is going to be … to devise the right defense strategy for the European defense industrial base in a way that Europeans will be able to essentially address the requirement to replace the type of support that they used to get from the US for their defense and security,” Ulgen explained.
“Now this is a long-term objective. Europeans cannot do this overnight … but this needs to start, and it will start. It has already started, to some extent,” he added.
Should Europe successfully navigate these first two hurdles, a third institutional question looms large: who leads?
“Number three is going to be to achieve an agreement about the role of the main security institutions … there will need to be an agreement about how to reform NATO and how to restructure NATO-EU cooperation,” he said.
‘Coalition of the willing’
As institutional gridlock hampers unified EU action, a nimbler approach is gaining momentum. Last month, several EU states gathered in Paris to coordinate Ukraine aid and explore defense options beyond traditional EU and NATO structures.
After the summit, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer proclaimed that the countries attending would work to build a “coalition of the willing” to offset a decline in US assistance to Kyiv.
Ulgen argues that this framework goes beyond aiding Ukraine and providing it with security guarantees it has long sought from the US against the possibility of future attacks by Russia — one of the two “core agendas at play.”
The other, he said, “is a broader, longer-term dialogue on the architecture of European defense” as it moves away from reliance on the US.
But doing so may prove difficult. According to Marta Muchnick, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, unified EU decision-making on defense matters has long been paralyzed by persistent vetoes by states like Hungary, something that the modal that emerged in Paris may help remedy.
“The coalition of the willing is emerging as a pragmatic response to the EU’s institutional limitations,” Muchnick told Anadolu. “It allows like-minded countries to act swiftly, especially as the war in Ukraine enters a critical phase and US support remains uncertain,” she said.
The nuclear question
For decades, France’s President Emmanuel Macron has been one of the most vocal advocates for Europe to build its own deterrence capabilities, repeatedly offering his country’s nuclear arsenal as a potential shield. While Germany has responded positively to these overtures, questions remain on whether it will be enough.
“I think one needs to underline that as things stand, this cannot be a replacement for the UK or the US nuclear umbrella,” Ulgen cautioned. “The capabilities that France has will not function the same way as in the nuclear umbrella which has been provided to Europe by the United States.”
While he noted that these discussions are intensifying amid “doubt over the sustainability of the US position,” Muchnick suggested that talk on the nuclear debate is “premature.”
She said that future decisions would largely depend on how Europe’s security architecture evolves, particularly if peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia commence under US mediation.
Türkiye’s potential role
As Europe scrambles to reinforce its defense posture, attention is turning to security partnerships with non-EU NATO allies like Türkiye and the UK.
Ulgen called deeper cooperation a “no-brainer,” but cited political and institutional hurdles — notably opposition from the Greek Cypriot administration and limits on Türkiye’s access to EU defense funding.
He also warned that treating non-EU partners as “second class” could undermine efforts.
While Ankara has not ruled out joining Ukraine-related missions, Ulgen stressed that coordination may hinge on shared threat perceptions and understandings with Russia.
Muchnick also emphasized that shared perception of potential threats will be fundamental to effective cooperation between countries. “If they don’t have the same threat perception … that’s the biggest challenge to coordination.”
Deterrence-based future
Looking ahead, Europe faces a delicate balancing act between military preparedness and diplomatic engagement.
“What we anticipate also is that we’re going to face a deterrence-based security future where Europeans will need to constantly play or strike the right balance between deterrence … and diplomacy,” Muchnick said.
She warned that Europeans must prepare for prolonged instability along the continent’s eastern frontier. “We are moving into a long war, or at least a long-term conflict,” she said.
“Even if Ukraine emerges as sovereign and independent, Russia will continue to perceive the West as a threat — and Europe must adapt to that reality.”
