By Selim Celal
ISTANBUL
On 15 July, Iranian judicial officials detained Hassan Faridoon, the brother of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s president, also his special advisor.
He is facing allegations of financial irregularities. Later on, he was reportedly dispatched to a hospital due to a health condition, from where he was released. The whole episode took only 24 hours.
It is too early to argue and prove that Faridoon was quickly released because Rouhani threatened the establishment in order to secure the release of his brother.
It is also too early to argue that Rouhani entered into a secret deal with the establishment to secure his brother's release.
However, what can be surmised is that Faridoon was not released due to his health condition, as there are several political and non-political prisoners with quite serious medical conditions, but the Iranian judiciary denies them the simplest treatment.
So the claim that Faridoon was released after his lawyer posted bail on his behalf, because of health reasons, does not make any sense. Iranian bureaucracy is way too cumbersome to allow for the completion of such a procedure in such a short time.
Faridoon not arrested for corruption
Apart from the authenticity of the allegations against Faridoon, the question is: who is not corrupt in the Islamic Republic?
There is a folk poem in Persian which reads: “If it is ordered that the drunk of the city be arrested/Then all those in the city should be arrested”. Iran ranks 131st in the global corruption index among 176 countries surveyed by Transparency International. Therefore, corruption cannot be sufficient reason behind Faridoon’s arrest.
Long before any corruption allegations, Faridoon made headlines during Iran’s nuclear negotiation with the international community. Even though he was not officially part of the negotiating team, he was present in almost every session.
It was claimed he would serve as a personal messenger between the negotiating team and President Rouhani. Rouhani’s cronies would justify his duty saying Faridoon was there to update the president and ask for instructions (using the Surkha’ee dialect, a local dialect of Persian used in President Rouhani’s birthplace) in order to evade any eavesdropping attempt by international spy agencies.
However, Faridoon’s role as a special advisor to the president in recent years has been a good case in point for President Rouhani’s opponents to criticize him for nepotism and also accuse Faridoon of abusing his relationship with the president and interfering in government affairs beyond his mandate.
This allegation can serve as a pretext to look into the nepotistic nature of the Iranian political system.
Nepotism: nothing new
In the Iranian political setup, family members of ruling elites always play important roles. It is safe to say that in the Islamic Republic of Iran, a position is outwardly occupied by one person but is in reality run jointly by a few close family members -- this is not a new phenomenon.
One can start with Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. Ayatollah Khomeini was the leader of the Islamic Republic, but the country was run by his son, Ahmad Khomeini. Ahmad Khomeini was a key person in the removal of Ayatollah Muntazeri from his position as surrogate of Ayatollah Khomeini. Ahmed Khomeini was also allegedly involved in the mass slaughter of political prisoners in the 1980s.
The same is true of Mujtaba Khamenei, the current Supreme Leader’s son: it is widely believed that Mujtaba Khamenei wields enormous influence in state affairs. It is even claimed that he had played a key role in the crackdown of Green Movement activists after the 2009 presidential election.
Earlier, during the 2005 presidential election, Ayatollah Karrobi, one of the presidential candidates, complained in an open letter to the Supreme Leader about the alleged involvement of Mujtaba Khamenei in electoral rigging.
Nepotism has been rampant among Iranian presidents as well. The late Hashimi Rafsanjani appointed his brother, Muhammad Hashemi, as his vice president for executive affairs. Similarly, Muhammad Khatami appointed his brother, Ali Khatami, as his chief of staff. Mahmood Ahmadinejad appointed his brother, Davood Ahmadinejad, as chief of president’s office of inspection.
In addition to these, any middle-ranking positions are always occupied by relatives of the sitting president.
The same trend can be observed among middle-ranking officials at the provincial level. For instance, the governor of Balochistan Province has appointed his nephew as the governor of Zahedan, the provincial capital.
One can hardly find a senior official in the Islamic Republic whose close family members are not occupying top positions. One should not forget that at present, Iran’s legislative and judicial branches are run by two brothers, Ali Larijani and Sadeq Larijani.
Their third brother, Javad Larijani, is the chief of Iran’s Human Rights Council. Their fourth brother, Bagher Larijani, used to be the deputy health minister. They are popularly known as the ‘Larijani brothers’.
Supreme Leader not averse to nepotism
Interestingly, the Supreme Leader has no objection to nepotism, but rather encourages it. During a meeting with former President Muhammad Khatami and his cabinet members on July 28, 2001, Ayatollah Khamenei read a verse from the Quran about Prophet Musa’s plea to God to appoint his brother Haroon as his deputy.
Taking this verse into account the Supreme Leader stated: “I articulated this point during the presidency of Ayatollah Rafsanjani, and also told it to President Khatami. I told him to appoint Ali Khatami, his brother, for investigation. He appointed him, and how good it was! One’s closest relatives should be appointed for investigation positions, so that people can see what is going on. It means that in addition to regular reports, an alternative source [of information] should be available.”
It is necessary to note that Iranians have no problem with nepotism, either. For instance, after the victory of Muhammad Khatami in 1997, his brother, Muhammad Reza Khatami, who had hitherto been unknown, garnered the highest vote in Tehran in the 2000 parliamentary election and eventually became deputy parliament speaker.
Similarly, late Rafsanjani’s daughter, Fayizeh Rafsanjani, would enjoy a large vote bank in the Iranian parliamentary elections due to her father’s high profile. Hence, nepotism is part and parcel of Iranian political culture and will never constitute an issue.
That said, Rouhani is about to introduce his cabinet members in the coming weeks. Obviously he is under pressure to share power with other interest groups.
On July 18, Muhammad Reza Arif, a leader of the reformist camp, after holding a meeting with Rouhani, said: “Some people, once they win, forget those who have struggled for them.” A day later, on July 19, Rouhani said at the cabinet meeting that it was now his 24 million voters’ turn to occupy the top governmental positions.
It clearly indicates that there is an ongoing tension between Rouhani and other political forces over the distribution of positions, and Faridoon is simply being scapegoated.
However, this tension has much to do with the tribal mentality among President Rouhani’s opponents, a subtle factor that is almost always ignored by most analysts.
Over the last four decades, most of the top Iranian authorities, one way or another, have developed family bonds. They are connected through what should be called ‘revolutionary marriages’ (marriage among revolutionaries or their family members). That being the case, the Iranian establishment is run by a group of families who are tied through a complicated web of inter-marriage.
For instance, former President Muhamad Khatami’s brother married the granddaughter of Ayatollah Khomeini.
Ali Larijani, the current speaker of the Iranian parliament, married the sister of Ali Mutahiri, his deputy speaker.
The Supreme Leader’s son Mujtaba Khamenei is the son-in-law of Haddad Adel, the former speaker of the parliament.
Another son of the Supreme Leader, Masud Khamenei, married the niece of Kamal Kharrazi, former Iranian foreign minister.
Kamal Kharrazi's own son married Muhammad Khatami’s daughter.
The Supreme Leader’s daughter is married to the son of Ayatollah Golpayegani, the president of the Supreme Leader’s office.
The former commander of the Guardian of the Islamic Revolution, Muhsin Razaei's son married the granddaughter of Ayatollah Khomeini.
Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, the current powerful mayor of Tehran, is the nephew of the Supreme Leader’s wife.
This list can just go on and on for pages; as a result of these marriages, a typical tribal mentality has developed among these in-laws.
Now, looking at this powerful web of revolutionary marriages, one can find that Hassan Rouhani is not connected to this web and is thus an outsider. Due to this disadvantage, right from the beginning, Rouhani has been trying to insert his own people into the system.
Over the last four years, dozens of his close relatives have been appointed to top governmental positions.
To cite a few examples, Rouhani’s nephew, Abdul Hussain Faridoon, has served as secretary of the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology. His another nephew, Ismaeel Samavi, is the head of the committee of young advisors to the president. Another nephew, Ali Monesan, is the director of the Kish Free Zone. Tahereh Qayoomi, daughter of Rouhani’s niece, is the head of the public relations office at the presidential palace.
Therefore, there are currently two interconnected tensions going side by side in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s political horizon. On the one hand, President Rouhani is under pressure to be more generous to the establishment elites in the new government. On the other, the establishment elites, due to their tribal mentality, are resisting the emergence of a new family in the power structure of Iran.
[The Turkey-based writer is an expert on Iran’s foreign policy and domestic politics.]
* Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu Agency.
